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I GIVE here a resume of some of the opinions I have expressed during
the last seven or eight years on the nature of the duality of the brain.
That the nervous system is double physically is evident enough.
This is a very striking fact, but one so well known that we are in danger
of ceasing to think of its significance—of ceasing to wonder at it.
A truth becomes a truism. The chief significance of the duality lies,
I think, in its bearing on what is most fundamental in mental opera-
tions—the double process of tracing relations of likeness and unlikeness.
The nervous system, I repeat, is physically double. I wish to show
that it is double in function also, and further, in what way it is double
in function. I shall speak of the brain only, taking illustrations,
however, from the lower parts of the nervous system.1
Not long ago few doubted the brain to be double in function as well
as physically bilateral; but now that it is certain, from the researches of
Dax, Broca, and others, that damage to but one lateral half can make a
man entirely speechless, the former view is disputed. Thus, Broca and
Moxon suppose that but one half of the brain—the left in the vast
majority of people—is educated in words, the function of the other half
not being developed in words.
Prior to the researches of Dax and Broca it might have been supposed
that the brain was double in function in either of two ways: (1) That
action of both halves was required in any mental operation; (2) that
either half (indifferently) would serve alone. Neither of these opinions
can now be held, with regard to words, at any rate. The two halves are
not double in function in the sense that both are required for speech,
since a patient can speak perfectly well when the right half of his brain
is damaged, in whatever part the damage is, and how extensive it may
be. Nor are they double in the sense that the two. halves are such exact
1
 I use'tho word " brain " to include the cerebral hemisphere and the subjacent motor and
sensorytract. I use the word " encephalon " to include all parts of the nervous system within
thn skull. It is convenient to use the word " half "—meaning a lateral half—when speaking
of the nervous system, and " side" when speaking of the body. Thus, disease in the left half
of the brain produces paralysis of the right side of the body.
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duplicates that either of them will do for speech, since extensive damage
in a certain region of the left hemisphere will destroy speech altogether.
Speaking in more detail, we say that, in the vast majority of cases,
extensive damage to the brain in the region of the corpus striatum on
the left destroys speech, and that equally extensive damage in the corre-
sponding region on the right does not affect speech at all.1 The reader
will observe that there is no expression of opinion as to the very exact
part of the brain injury of which produces loss of speech. Whilst I
believe that the hinder part of the left third frontal convolution is the
part most often damaged, I do not localize speech in any such small part
of the brain. To locate the damage which destroys speech and to locate
speech are two different things. The damage is, in my experience,
always in the region of the corpus striatum; but in this article it will
suffice to speak of the half of the brain affected; it is admitted that
there are exceptional cases ; loss of speech has occurred from damage to
the region mentioned on the right, and the region on the left has been
damaged without any affection of speech. But the matter of most
significance is that damage to but one hemisphere ivill make a man
speechless. This no physician denies, so far as I know.
I shall suppose in what follows that loss of speech results from
damage to the left half of the brain, although it matters nothing for
the argument which half it is. It is enough that there is in every
man one half, be it right or left, damage of which will make him
speechless.
Contradictory as it may appear at first glance, I think the facts of
cases of loss of speech from damage to but one—the left—half of the
brain show conclusively that, as regards use of words, the brain is double
in function. But the verysame cases show also that the two hemi-
spheres are not mere duplicates in this function. I hope to show two
things—(1) that both halves are alike, in so far that each contains
processes for words; (2) that they are unlike, in that the left only is for
use of words in speech and the right for " other processes in which words
serve." We shall afterwards show that these expressions are only used
to mark extremes of degree. Anticipating what has to come, we say
that the right hemisphere is the one for the most automatic use of
words, and the left the one in which automatic use of words merges into
1
 la this article I illustrate by cases of loss of speech, not by cases of defect of speech,
I do this for the sake of simplicity. As will be mentioned later in this paper, there are
numerous varieties and degrees of defect of speech from different degrees of damage to different
parts in the region of the corpus striatum.
BRAIN.—VOL. xxXVirr; 6
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voluntary use of words—into speech. Otherwise stated, the right is the
half of the brain for the automatic use of words, the left the half for both
the automatic and the voluntary use. The expression I have formerly
used is that the left is the " leading " half for words (speech). We must
now say what we mean here by speech.
Speaking is not simply the utterance of words. The utterance
of any number of words would not constitute speech. Speaking is
" propositionizing." To this meaning the term speech must be rigidly
kept.1 That the speechless patient cannot propositionize aloud is obvious
—he never does. He cannot propositionize internally. He can neither
say " gold is yellow " aloud nor to himself. The proof that he does not
speak internally is that he cannot express himself in writing. He may
write in the sense of copying writing, and can usually copy print in
writing characters. Now, if he can speak internally, why does he not
write what he says to himself ? He can say nothing to himself, and
therefore has nothing to write.2
For its character as speech it matters nothing whether the proposi-
tion be said to oneself or spoken aloud. Anatomically and physio-
logically regarded, we say that the same nervous processes are concerned
in internal as in external speech. The difference is that the excitation
of these nervous processes in speaking to oneself is so slight that
the nerve currents developed do not spread to the articulatory and
vocal muscles ;• in speaking aloud the excitation is strong, and currents
do reach those muscles. This fundamental similarity and superficial
difference between internal and external speech must be kept well in
mind.
So, then, the speechless patient has lost speech, not only in the
popular sense that he cannot speak aloud, but in the fullest sense ; he
cannot propositionize in any fashion. If this be really so, we must not
say that speech is external thought, for there is no essential difference
betwixt internal and external speech. We speak not only to tell other
people what we think, but to tell ourselves what we think. Speech is a
1
 It is evident enough that there is much behind speech ; a proposition is but an end of a
series of mental processes and a beginning of another series. But these things do not
concern us just yet.
1
 In cases of defect of speech there is difficulty in writing. In some cases of defect of speech
there remains considerable power of writing. I know that cases of loss of speech have been
recorded by eminent physicians, ra which ability to write was not lost. The chronic cases of
this kind that I have seen have been mostly cases of pretended loss of speech. Besides, how
is it conceivable that a person who has lost speech should be able,to express himself in writing ?
If a person can express himself in writing, he gives proof that he has not lost speech. We
must speak internally before we write—before we express ourselves in writing.
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part of thought—a part which we may or may not exteriorize. Again,
it is not well to say that thought is internal speech, for the man who is
speechless (the man who has no internal speech) can think. How well
or ill he can think we shall discuss later. His condition results from
a unilateral lesion; his left hemisphere is damaged, but his right is
healthy, and in that hemisphere there still, I suppose, lie processes for
words.
There are two ways in which words serve in thought; speech is but
one way, and this, whether it be internal or external, is, speaking
physiologically, a function of the left cerebral hemisphere.
Those who do not limit the definition of speech as we have done,
would suppose that if a man had lost speech altogether (internal as well
as external) there could be nothing further to say about words in his
case; for it is sometimes assumed that words serve only in speech.
But the cases of persons who have lost speech show, I consider, that
speechlessness does not imply wordlessness1; for if I say to a man who
cannot speak at all, " Gold is yellow " (or anything not difficult2 or
novel to him), he readily understands it. This shows that he still has
processes for words in his brain. His " ideas " of gold and yellow are
only to be reached through words. If he had not processes for words
in himself, how could he possibly understand my words ? My words
revive his words. If they did not, I might as well speak to him in
a language he did not understand, or clap my hands.
To coin the word "verbalizing," to include all ways in which words
serve, I would assert that both halves of the brain are alike, in that each
serves in verbalizing. That the left does is evident, because damage of it
makes a man speechless. That the right does may be inferred, because
the speechless man understands all I say to him on ordinary matters.
And yet since the patient cannot repeat after me, even in writing, the
proposition he so readily understands (since he can only receive it and
cannot give it out), it follows that the word processes which remain in
his right undamaged hemisphere are not of the same kind as those by
1
 I ought to mention, however, that it has been said that cases of loss of speech give proof
that thought is possible without words; it being tacitly assumed that the speechless patient
is wordless. The speechless man can think, I suppose, because he has in automatic forms
all the words he ever had; he will be lame in his thinking, because, not being able to revive
words (to speak to himself), he will not be able to register new and complex experiences of
things.
2
 In order that a healthy person may understand anything very novel or difficult, speech
is evidently required—mostly internal, but it may be external. If a person be told anything
complex, we may hear him telling it again to himself. This, I suppose, the speechless
patient cannot do; but to superficial observation he understands everything. He under-
stands tales read to him, and remembers their incidents.
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which speech results. In other terms, word processes are not of the
same kind in each half of the brain.
Let us consider the two different ways in which, as I suppose, words
serve in the two halves of the brain. I illustrate by propositionizing
and receiving propositions. To receive a proposition and to form one
are plainly two very different things. It is true that in each case our
own nervous centres for words are concerned; but when we receive
a proposition the process is entirely automatic, and unless we are deaf,
or what is for the time equivalent, absorbed, we cannot help receiving
it. When anyone says to me " Gold is yellow," I am, so to speak, his"
victim, and the words he utters rouse similar ones in me; there is no
effort on my part; the revival occurs in spite of me if my ears be healthy.
Moreover, the speaker makes me a double gift; he not only revives
words in my brain, but he revives them in a particular order—he
revives a proposition. But if I have to say, " Gold is yellow," I have
to revive the words, and I have to put them in propositional order.
The speechless man can receive propositions, but he cannot form them
—cannot speak.
The left half of the brain is that by which we speak, for damage of
it makes us speechless; the right is the half by which we receive
propositions.1
But this is only an imperfect way of putting it. We, as anatomists
and physiologists, have to do only with nervous processes for impressions
and movements, and their conditions of energizing; and, as before said,
we have to bear in mind that the essential thing is excitation of nervous
processes. We have not to dwell with exaggeration on actual move-
ments from strong excitations. I say movements advisedly.
We have, as anatomists and physiologists, to study not ideas, but
the material substrata of ideas (anatomy) and the modes and conditions
of energizing of these substrata (physiology). Where most would say
that the speechless patient has lost the memory of words, I would say
that he has lost the anatomical substrata of words.2
1
 For fear of misunderstanding, let me now remark, that although betwixt propositionizing
and receiving a proposition there is the difference that in the former process there is usually
actual utterance and in the latter usually only internal revival of words, this is not the
most essential difference. The essential difference is not that betwixt the internal and
external use of words, for speech may be internal; we can, and constantly are speaking to
ourselves. The difference is in, or corresponds to, the voluntary and automatic use of words.
2
 Psychology is the elder science ; mental operations were studied before the brain was
known to be the organ of mind. Hence, however much we may wish to study the anatomy
and physiology of the higher parts of the nervous system without psychological bias, we are
obliged, for lack of others, to use words which have psychological implications. The words
" voluntary " and " automatic" are such words, but they are also used physiologically.
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The anatomical substratum of a word is a nervous process of a highly
special movement of the articulatory series. That we may have an
" idea " of the word, it suffices that the nervous process for it energizes ;
it is not necessary that it energizes so strongly that currents reach the
articulatory muscles. How it is that from any degree of energizing of
any kind of arrangement of any sort of matter we have " ideas " of any
kind is not a point we are here concerned with. Ours is not a psycho-
logical inquiry. It is a physiological investigation, and our method
must be physiological. We have no direct concern with " ideas," but
. with more or less complex processes for impressions and movements.
When movements of words are spoken of, it is not necessarily meant
that actual movement of the articulatory muscles occurs. As already
mentioned, there is in the left hemisphere during internal speech simply
a slight excitation of the highest of the nervous processes of the articu-
latory series, which are strongly excited when words are actually
uttered. Similarly, in the automatic revival of movements for words in
the right side of the brain (as, for example, in receiving speech of
others), there is supposed to be a slight excitation. These may be
spoken of as nascent movements, or " ideal" movements. Saying
nothing of dreaming that we are speaking, of dreaming of objects and
of the internal sight of the blind, there is plenty of positive proof from
morbid conditions that central excitations give us ideas of movements
when there are no actual movements. The most striking is the produc-
tion of movements, necessarily ideal, of an absent hand by faradizing
the stump. The excitations in this case must be central, awakened by
a stimulus of the sensory nerves roused into activity by faradism. The
excitation of sensori-motor processes for words, even in the right cerebral
hemisphere, may be so strong that these words are occasionally actually
uttered. Thus, a speechless patient whose left hemisphere is damaged
may occasionally swear when vexed. We now, therefore, classify the
movements of verbalizing physiologically into voluntary and automatic,
which classification corresponds to propositionizing and to receiving
propositions. So now I say the right half of the brain is for the
automatic reproduction of movements of words, and the left the side for
their voluntary reproduction.
But here we must mention that this distinction is not absolute;
there are nowhere in the body absolute demarcations betwixt voluntary
and automatic movements ; and there are in health all gradations from
the most automatic use of words to their most voluntary use. Let us
show some of the steps : (1) Receiving a proposition. (2) Simple and
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compound interjections, as " O h ! " and "God bless my life!" (3)
Well-organized conventional phrases, as " Good-bye," " Not at all,"
" Very well." (4) Statements requiring careful, and, metaphorically
speaking, personal supervision of the relation each word of a proposition
bears to the rest. We now'amend the former' statement, and say that
the right is the automatic side for words and the left the side where
automatic use of words merges into voluntary use of ivords (speech). In
healthy persons, I suppose there is automatic revival of words prior to
their voluntary revival (speech).
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